577 N.Y.S.2d 430
(Cite as: 178 A.D.2d 503, 577 N.Y.S.2d 430)

Dec. 16, 1991.

Action was brought to enforce judgment of Florida State Court. The Supreme Court, Suffolk County, McCarthy, J., entered judgment granting plaintiff's motion for summary judgment in lieu of complaint, and defendant appealed. The Supreme Court, Appellate Division, held that New York resident who had signed note, payable in Florida, for his interest in Florida limited partnership was subject to long?arm jurisdiction of Florida court.

Affirmed.

West Headnotes

[1] Judgment k818(1)
228k818(1)

New York courts will not enforce judgment of sister state, where it is shown that state in which judgment was entered did not have jurisdiction over defendant.

[2] Courts k12(2.30)
106k12(2.30)

New York resident who had signed note, payable in Florida, for his interest in Florida limited partnership "breached contract in state," within meaning of Florida long?arm statute, when he failed to make payments pursuant to terms of note. West's F.S.A. § 48.193(1)(g).

[3] Constitutional Law k305(5) 92k305(5)

Critical consideration, in deciding whether defendant has sufficient minimum contacts with forum that court may exercise personal jurisdiction over him consistent with requirements of due process, is whether defendant's conduct in connection with forum is such that he should reasonably have anticipated being sued there. U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 14.

[4] Constitutional Law k305(5) 92k305(5)

[4] Courts k12(2.30) 106k12(2.30)

New York resident who signed note, payable in Florida, for his interest in Florida limited partnership had sufficient contacts with Florida that he should reasonably have anticipated being sued there when he failed to make payments on note; accordingly, Florida court could exercise in personam jurisdiction consistent with requirements of due process. U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 14. **430 Weg & Myers, P.C., New York City (Frank A. Weg and Dennis T. D'Antonio, of counsel), for appellant.

Donovan Leisure Newton & Irvine, New York City (Robert T. Loos, Charles W. Gerdts III, and Peter A. Bicks, of counsel), for respondent.

Before LAWRENCE, J.P., and BALLETTA, ROSENBLATT and O'BRIEN, JJ.

MEMORANDUM BY THE COURT.

*503 In an action to enforce a judgment of a court of the State of Florida, the defendant appeals from (1) an order of the Supreme Court, Suffolk County (McCarthy, J.), entered January 16, 1990, which granted the plaintiff's motion for summary judgment in lieu of complaint, and (2) a judgment of the same court, entered March 1, 1990, thereon.

ORDERED that the appeal from the order is dismissed; and it is further,

ORDERED that the judgment is affirmed; and it is further,

ORDERED that the plaintiff is awarded one bill of costs.

The appeal from the intermediate order must be dismissed because the right of direct appeal therefrom terminated with **431 the entry of judgment in the action (see, Matter of Aho, 39 N.Y.2d 241, 248, 383 N.Y.S.2d 285, 347 N.E.2d 647). The issues raised on appeal from the order are brought up for review and have been considered on the appeal from the judgment (CPLR 5501[a][1] ).

The defendant Richard Reckmeyer, a New York resident, executed a promissory note in the amount of $80,000 for his interest in a Florida limited partnership, the purpose of which was to own and/or manage a shopping center located in Florida. All payments on the note were to be made to Florida. City Federal Savings Bank (hereinafter City Federal) became a holder in due course of the note on December 31, 1985. Reckmeyer ceased making payments on the note on October 1, 1987, and City Federal accelerated the balance due. City Federal commenced an action in Florida, culminating in a judgment requiring Reckmeyer to pay the unpaid principal, interest, costs and attorneys' fees. City Federal then brought a motion for summary judgment in lieu of complaint in the Supreme Court, Suffolk County, in an attempt to enforce the Florida judgment. Reckmeyer opposed City Federal's summary judgment motion, claiming that New York need not give full faith and credit to the Florida judgment. He claimed that the Florida court had no personal jurisdiction over him because he had no contacts with Florida. The Supreme Court held that the Florida court properly exercised personal jurisdiction over Reckmeyer pursuant to Florida's long-arm statute. We agree.

[1] New York courts will not enforce a judgment of a sister state where it is shown that the state in which the judgment was entered did not have jurisdiction over the defendant (see, Gladding Corp. v. Balco?Pedrick Parts Corp., 76 A.D.2d 1, 429 N.Y.S.2d 940). *504 Determining whether a court properly asserted jurisdiction over a defendant requires a two?pronged analysis. The court must determine whether the requirements of Florida's long?arm statute were satisfied and whether the exercise of jurisdiction comports with principles of due process under Federal constitutional law (see, Cauff Lippman & Co. v. Apogee Finance Group, 745 F.Supp. 678).

[2] Florida's long?arm statute confers jurisdiction over any person who "breach[es] a contract in this state by failing to perform acts required by contract to be performed in this state" (Florida Statutes § 48.193[1][g] ). Under Florida law, Reckmeyer's failure to make payments pursuant to the terms of the promissory note falls within the ambit of Florida Statutes § 48.193(1)(g) (see, Thompson v. King, 523 F.Supp. 180).

[3][4] Turning to the due process requirements of the Federal Constitution, we must determine whether Reckmeyer had minimum contacts with the forum State such that the maintenance of the suit does not offend traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice (International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 66 S.Ct. 154, 90 L.Ed. 95). The critical consideration is whether Reckmeyer's conduct and connection with the forum State were such that he should reasonably have anticipated being sued there (see, Worldwide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 100 S.Ct. 559, 62 L.Ed.2d 490). We find that Reckmeyer purposefully availed himself of the privilege of conducting activities within the forum State, as evidenced by his investment in the limited partnership for tax purposes. Thus, Reckmeyer's contact with the forum State was deliberate. Further, there was a nexus between Reckmeyer's contact with Florida and the cause of action (see, Thompson v. King, 523 F.Supp. 180, supra ). Therefore, the Florida court's assertion of personal jurisdiction over him satisfied the due process requirements of the Federal Constitution.